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the contractual relationship between the
university and its students. 370 A.2d at
1366. The court indicated, however, that
bulletin listings of projected tuition increases does not support finding a contractual obligation. [d. This examination
must be made in light of principles of contract interpretation.
This construction must be made with
an eye to the circumstances and to the intent of the parties. Terms of the document
are to be given their common meaning.
[d. at 1367. The court quoted from the
RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS §32 (1932):
An offer must be so definite in its
terms, or require such definite terms in
the acceptance, that the promises and
performances to be rendered by each
party are reasonably certain.
Viewing the language of the Bulletin as
a whole, and with a reasonable view
toward the language surrounding the
remarks concerning tuition costs, the
court stated that" [tl hese words expressed
an expectancy by the University regarding
future increases. This is not a promise
susceptible of enforcement." 370 A.2d at
1368.
In essence, the court found that the
university attempted to provide rational
guidelines for tuition costs. It had not intended to create an inflexible obligation
on its part to maintain fixed tuition rates
when the economic realities of operating a
university medical school would defeat
that attempt at price stability, and force
the school to operate at a loss. Such an
unknown economic variable did arrive on
the scene when the federal government all
but eliminated. its support for medical/health educational programs in Washington by a decrease in funding through
the District of Columbia Medical and Dental Manpower Act.
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Growth Of
Vicarious
Liability

Checked
by John Jeffrey Ross
When tort law assigns to an institution
liability for the injurious acts of an indiVidual, the role of the law of civil accountability as social engineering
becomes especially clear. An important
legal concept which assists this function is
the theory of respondeat superior, where
an entity actually remote from the transaction resulting in injury is held responSible because the acting defendant is, or appears to be, the agent of the party
ultimately liable.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently considered the liability of the
remote principal founded on apparent
agency, but in reversing a judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals, refused to
assign responsibility beyond the immediate parties to the event. B.P. Oil Corporation v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d
554 (1977).
Claude Mabe drove into a service station because his car was low on fuel and
water. He asked the attendant for water to
fill the radiator, and the employee produced a can filled with a volatile liquid.
When Mabe poured this into the hot
radiator there was an explosion. Mabe was
injured, and he sued.
The gas station was adorned with British Petroleum insignia: uniforms, gas
pumps, a station vehicle, and a large sign
exhibiting the BP letters and colors. Mabe
had entered the station because he " ...
always buy[sl BP gasoline, always deal[sl
with BP." 279 Md. at 636, 370 A.2d at
557. He therefore decided to deal with BP
in court too, and named the corporation
as a defendant, claiming that the injuries
"stemmed directly from the negligent and
tortious conduct of the defendants and
their agents ... " 279 Md. at 634, 370
A.2d, at 556.

The jury returned a verdict for Mabe.
As consumers they were apparently convinced that Mabe's reliance on the ample
exhibition of BP insignia as indicative of
good products and service meant that he
thought he had entered a station under
the competent direction of the defendant
corporation. The trial court, however, entered a judgment n.o.v., "finding 'no
agency of any kind .... " 279 Md. at 634,
370 A.2d at 556. The Court of Special
Appeals reversed, finding there was agency by estoppel. Mabe v. B.P. Oil Corporation, 31 Md.App. 221, 356 A.2d 304
(1976). (See The FORUM, Vol. VII, No.
2, p. 26)
After granting certiorari, the Court of
Appeals examined two theories of action:
actual and apparent agency. In considering the former, it found that the owner of
the station, Faison, leased the premises
from a third party, further leased the station to B.P. which in turn, by a reciprocal
agreement, leased it back to Faison. The

rents between B.P. and Faison were contingent on the amount of gasoline sold,
payment for such fuel being the actual
rental fee. Other facts dispositive of the
actual agency theory were the lack of salary and commission from B.P., and absence of control by the corporation in the
hiring and payment of the station's
employees. lt was found that Faison controlled the operation of the station and
that B.P.'s role was limited to that of selling its products to Mabe (and only when
he was able to pay for them).
The court concluded that there was no
direct control by B.P. over the operation

of the station such as to indicate an actual
agency relationship. 279 Md. at 643, 370
A.2d at 560. See Keitz v. National Paving
Co., 214 Md. 479, 134 A.2d 296 (1957).
The law of agency by estoppel is expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§267 (1958) as follows:
One who represents that another is his
servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is
subject to liability to the third person
for harm caused by the lack of care or
skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
This reliance must be actual and on the
part of the person injured. It is not sufficient that third parties direct the injured
based on their faith in the apparent agency. 279 Md. at 644, 370 A.2d at 561.
In order for Mabe to recover, the record
must show such reliance on his part:
reliance on the skill of the apparent agent.
It was insufficient to show attraction to
the station merely because it offered British Petroleum products. 279 Md. at 647,
370 A.2d at 562.
After its examination of the record, the
court concluded that such reliance on
Mabe's part was lacking; he entered this
station rather than others in the proximate area because it provided B.P. products. In its interpretation of the record,
the court cited a number of cases which
held that the presence of an oil company's
insignia was insufficient to establish the
agency relationship (Levine v. Standard
Oil Co., 249 Miss. 651, 163 So.2d 750
(1964) and that the corporation's representations were limited to showing the
presence of its products. See Sherman v.
Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d
916 (1960).
In reversing the Court of Special Appeals and denying recovery, the court
found Mabe's attraction to the station to
constitute no more than choice of products. 279 Md. at 649, 370 A.2d at 564.
Judge Levine dissented vigorously. He
noted that the court of Special Appeals
sitting en bane had found the other way
with only one dissent. The implication
was that the solution of the case turned on
an interpretation of the record, and that
the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to Mabe was sufficient to support the jury verdict. Mabe had stated at
trial that he not only bought B.P. products, but that he always dealt with B.P.
It is apparent that this case is solved by
a point over which reasonable men differ,
and that there is considerable justification
for a new trial. Instead, we are left with a
narrow view of vicarious liability in this
area, with limits of responsibility closely
drawn and tightly circumscribed.

Trounced For
An Ounce
by John Jeffrey Ross
Noting that the Eighth Amendment has
generally been invoked to proscribe "barbarous methods of punishment," a federal
judge recently called upon the flexible
and dynamic nature of the Constitution to
grant a petition for habeas corpus relief
from two consecutive 20-year sentences.
Davis v. Zahradniek, 432 F. Supp. 444
(W.O. Va. 1977).
Petitioner Davis had been incarcerated
after convictions in a Virginia court for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for its actual distribution. The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the
convictions and the sentences and Davis
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in
the United States District Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2254. In addition to his
Eighth Amendment claims, Davis contended: that he was denied a trial by an

impartial jury; that he was subjected to an
illegal search and seizure; that the
government failed to prove possession of
marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the state failed to show that the
substance involved was illegal contraband
under the Virginia statute. 432 F.Supp. at
446-447.
The District Court rejected any arguments alleging error in the conduct of the
trial, and the case turned solely on the
Eighth Amendment claim that the 20year sentence (plus a $20,000 fine) was
constitutionally offensive in light of the
nature of the offense.
After considering whether the length of
a sentence can serve as a basis for "habeas
relief," the court indicated that the disproportionality of the sentence in relationship to the offense constitutes excessiveness which is the "hallmark of
cruel and unusual punishment." 432
F.Supp. at 450.
In granting the petition, the court considered four elements in its constitutional
examination of the sentence. First considered was the nature of the offense. The
fact that the amount of marijuana was less
than nine ounces and the absence of any
aspect of violence in the offense were crucial to the disposition of this petition.
Regarding the second factor, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, it
was eminently clear to the court that the
legislative frustration of the sale of a questionably harmful drug could be served by
a less severe punishment.
Third, after an examination of punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions, the court noted the relative excessiveness of the Virginia sentence.
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